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COMMUNITY PROPERTY-ADMINISTRATION OF WIFE'S SEPARATE
PROPERTY-INTENTION AS TO USE OF FRuITS NOT A CRrrERION-
Plaintiff, wife, received income from three sources-(1) two
trusts over which she had no control; (2) stocks which were
subject to an agreement authorizing a brother of the plaintiff to
vote said stock; and (3) interest on notes of the Jackson Brewing
Company. The wife contended that the income was community
property and she should be taxed on only one-half the fruits. It
was her intention to administer the property for the benefit of
the community and the income in question was in fact used for
that purpose. The defendant contended that the income was not
commiunity property since the plaintiff's husband had not admin-
istered either alone or indifferently the wife's separate property
from which the income was derived. Held, the question as to
where the fruits fall depends entirely on whether "the husband
had a hand in the management or administration of the separate
property of the wife." The "mere clipping of coupons from bonds
or the assisting of the wife in going to the bank box, or the giving
of advice now and then" did not "constitute such an administra-
tion by the husband as is contemplated by the Code." Thus the
fruits do not go into the community. Trorlicht v. Collector of
Revenue, 25 So. (2d) 547 (La. App. 1946).
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that "The wife has the
right to administer personally her paraphernal property, with-
out the assistance of her husband;"' that "The paraphernal prop-
erty, which is not administered by the wife separately and alone,
is considered to be under the management of the husband;" 2 that
"When the paraphernal property is administered by the husband,
or by him and the wife indifferently, the fruits of this property,
whether natural, civil, or the result of labour, belong to the con-
jugal partnership, if there exists a community of gains;" and
1. Art. 2384, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 2385, La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 2386, La. Civil Code of 1870. (This Article was amended by Act
286 of 1944, § 1, to read in part, "The fruits of the paraphernal property of
the wife, wherever the property be located and however administered,
whether natural, civil, including interest, dividends and rents, or from the
result of labor, fall into the conjugal partnfership, if there exists a commu-
nity of acquets and gains; unless the wife, by a written instrument, shall
declare that she reserves all of such fruits for her own separate use and
benefit and her intention to administer such property separately and alone.
The said instrument shall be executed before a notary public and two wit-
nesses and duly recorded in the conveyance records of the parish where the
community is domiciled." This amendment was not considered by the court
as the issues involved occurred prior to the passing of the amendment.)
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that "This partnership or community consists of the profits of all
the effects of which the husband has the administration and en-
joyment."' But nowhere in the Code is there any express lan-
guage which defines the word "administer" as used in these ar-
ticles.
Judging from the judicial interpretations of the word, the
best of which is found in Miller v. Handy,' it appears that ad-
ministration involves the actual control and management of the
property." In order for the fruits to remain the separate property
of the wife she has to retain the "sole, separate and exclusive
authority"' over her property. The minute she permits her hus-
band to take over the control and management, either completely
or jointly with her, the fruits cease to be separate and become
community property.8 Therefore, it may be said that administra-
tion by the husband depends not so much on what the husband
does as what the wife does or, in failing to do, allows her husband
to do. The wife has to give her consent either tacitly or expressly.
There must also be an intent for the husband to administer the
property for his own benefit and that of the community. Without
such an intent the administration might amount to no more than
that of an agency in which case the fruits would still be sep-
4. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870, as amended by Act 68 of 1902.
5. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160, 164 (1881) which says, "What is meant
by the wife's administration 'separately and alone', is the retention of the
administration under her sole, separate and exclusive control and authority,
with the view of making the revenues her own. What is meant by leaving
the administration to her husband is the exercise of a voluntary election,
by which she abandons her own right of authority and control and suffers
the husband to manage, not as her agent and subject to her authority, but
as if the property were his own. So long as the acts of the spouses make
it clear and certain that the wife intends to reserve the administration to
herself and for her own benefit, and to permit no acts to be done in reference
thereto except by herself either in person or through properly constituted
agents, and that the husband does not assume to interfere in the adminis-
tration except as the express and open agent of the wife, we can see nothing
to prevent the administration from being considered as that of the wife
'separately and alone', in the sense of the law."
See also Paul v. Arnoult, 164 La. 841, 843, 114 So. 706, 708 (1927) in which
it was said, "Such a case (referring to a case of separate property of the
wife under the administration of her husband) is presented only when the
husband, with the consent of the wife, uses the separate estate of the wife
for his own benefit or that of the community. It is not presented when the
husband acts merely as the agent of his wife and for her benefit." Accord:
Lambert v. Franchebois, 16 La. 1, 5 (1840) which says, "the paraphernal
property of a married woman is not bound for the debts contracted by the
husband; and .... the fruits, proceeding from such property, do not belong
to the community, unless the wife permits the husband to administer it."
6. Black's Law Dictionary, p. 37; Webster's New International Diction-
ary of the English Language, Second Edition, p. 34.
7. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881).
8. Arts. 2363 and 2385, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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arate property., It is not meant to imply, however, that such
consent and intent without an actual administration by the hus-
band would determine the nature of the fruits.'0
Property in possession of, and administered by, the husband
is presumed to belong to the community.11 The husband is pre-
sumed to exercise administration until the contrary be shown,
and the burden of proof is on those who contest it.12
It has been argued in federal tax cases that because a wife
"who has left to her husband the administration of her para-
phernal property, may afterwards withdraw it from him,"13 she,
in effect, never actually loses the administration, and that there-
fore the fruits never go into the community. The courts, how-
ever, have not sanctioned this idea."
There are some proponents who contend that the purpose
for which the fruits are used and the intent of the wife as to how
they should be used are determining factors as to whether the
fruits are separate or community property.1 Although the courts
have held that there is no basis for such a theory, the idea prob-
ably originated from Article 1578 of the Code Napoleon of 1804
which was incorporated verbatim" in the Louisiana Civil Code of
180817 in which it was stated that "If the husband has enjoyed
the paraphernal effects of his wife, without a letter of attorney,
but without any opposition on her part, he is bound at the time
of dissolution of the marriage, or on the first demand of his wife,
9. Simoneaux v. Heiluin, 27 La. Ann. 183 (1875); Risher v. Risher, 179
La. 1, 153 So. 1 (1934); K. & M. Store, Inc. v. Lewis, 22 So. (2d) 769 (La. App.
1945). Accord: Lucas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 134 F.(2d) 319
(C.C.A. 5th, 1943); Dodd v. Succession of Orillion, 14 La. Ann. 68 (1859);
Miller v. Handy, 33 IA. Ann. 160 ,(1881); Paul v. Arnoult, 164 La. 841, 114 So.
706 (1927); Guss v. Mathews, 179 La. 1033, 155 So. 765 (1934).
10. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyman, 135 F.(2d) 49 (C.C.A.
5th, 1943); Trezevant v. Holmes, 38 La. Ann. 146 (1886). But cf. Miller v.
Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881); Paul v. Arnoult, 164 La. 841, 114 So. 706
(1927).
11. Art. 2384, La. Civil Code of 1870; Bostwick v. Gasquet, 11 La. 534
(1838); Rashel v. Leroux, 18 La. Ann. 588 (1866); Houghton v. Hall, 177 La.
237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
12. Breaux v. Leblanc, 16 La. Ann. 145 (1861); Fortier v. Barry, 111 La.
776, 35 So. 900 (1904); Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
13. Art. 2387, La. Civil Code of 1870.
14. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyman, 135 F.(2d) 49 (C.C.A.
5th, 1943).
15. Miller v. Handy, 33 La. Ann. 160 (1881); Paul v. Arnoult, 164 La.
841, 114 So, 706 (1927).
16. When translating from the Code Napoleon the authors of the Code
of 1808 translated the word "fruits" incorrectly and put the word "profits"
in the article. 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, Compiled Editions of the Civil
Codes of Louisiana (1940) 1311.
17. Art. 60, La. Civil Code of 1808.
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only to account for existing fruits, and he is not accountable for
such as have been previously consumed." The article was
changed, however, in 1825,8 and since that time the word "ad-
minister" appears rather than the word "enjoy." Hence, it would
seem that there is now no basis for the theory that the "use"
should determine the status of the property.
There are a number of cases analogus to the one under dis-
cussion, but in each case where it was held that there was admin-
istration by the husband it was clear that he had the actual con-
trol and management of the property1" and that there was no
agency. Acts that naturally resulted from the marriage relation-
ship could "not in law be considered as substantive acts of ad-
ministration.""0 In the principal case it is clear that there was
no administration of the trusts by the husband. They, of neces-
sity, had to be administered by the trustee. It is equally clear,
judging from the decisions cited above, that there was no admin-
istration of the stocks and interest bearing notes by the husband.
The proceeds from these securities were in effect continuing gifts,
and it is submitted that there was no administration by any one
18. Art. 2363, La. Civil Code of 1825 states, "When the paraphernal prop-
erty is administered by the husband, or by him and the wife indifferently,
the fruits of this property, whether natural, civil, or the result of labour,
belong to the conjugal partnership, if there exist a community of gains
.' "This article was incorporated in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 as Article
2386 and remained unchanged until 1944 when it was amended by Act 286
of 1944, § 1. The complete revision of this article in 1825 of course rendered
the comments of French authorities of little or no value to American jurists.
19. Lazard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 153 F.(2d) 348, 349
(C.C.A. 5th, 1946) which said that, "The property here in question was given
to the wife by her father, and when the title was vested in her the property
had already been leased and oil had been produced on the property. Each
month the taxpayer received a check for her oil royalties. The husband had
absolutely nothing to do with the management, control or supervision of
the property." Dodd v. Succession of Orillion, 14 La. Ann. 68 (1859) in which
the wife appointed as her agent and administrator her coproprietor. The
court said, "The fact that he (the husband) was consulted by plaintiff's
agent as to crops, settlement of accounts, etc., subject always to plaintiff's
ratification, did not change the character of the administration. It was an
administration of the wife, and not of the husband." On rehearing the court
said (speaking of the husband's acts), "They were 'acts that naturally re-
sulted from the relation of husband and wife, and can not in law be con-
sidered as substantive acts of administration by which rights to property
are acquired." See also Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hyman, 135
F.(2d) 49 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943); Lucas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
134 F.(2d) 319 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943); Guss v. Mathews, 179 La. 1033, 155 So. 765
(1934); Trezevant v. Holmes, 38 La. Ann. 146 (1886); Risher v. Risher, 179
La. 1, 153 So. 1 (1934).
20. Dodd v. Succession of Orillion, 14 La. Ann. 68 (1859).
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unless it can be said that clipping a coupon or depositing a check
is an administration of property. The conclusion that the court
reached is well substantiated by all previous judicial interpreta-
tions on the subject.
JOHN D. DAGGETT
INDEMNITY-RIGHT OF MASTER AGAINST SERVANT-NECESSITY
OF PRIOR JUDGMENT AGAINST CLAIMANT-A widow brought suit
for $44,265 against the driver whose negligence allegedly caused
her husband's death and against the driver's employer. The trial
in the lower court resulted in a judgment in the widow's favor
against the employer in the amount of twelve thousand dollars.
Before either party appealed, the claim was compromised by
the widow and the employer, the latter paying seven thousand
dollars and both agreeing not to prosecute an appeal. The em-
ployer then sought indemnity from the driver in the amount thus
paid the widow. He stated as his cause of action that he had been
compelled to pay seven thousand dollars in order to be rid of
the judgment for twelve thousand dollars and that the cause of
the judgment being rendered against him was the driver's negli-
gence in causing the death of the widow's husband. On appeal,
the Louisiana Supreme Court sustained the driver's exception
of no cause or right of action. This decision was based primarily
upon the ground that the plaintiff employer had not been com-
pelled by a final judgment to pay any amount to the widow.
Winford v. Bullock, 26 So. (2d) 822 (La. 1946).
A review of the jurisprudence indicates that Louisiana is
among that minority of states which allow contribution between
joint tortfeasors.1 The recent trend toward allowing such con-
tribution has been evidenced in some states by legislative enact-
mentse and in others by judicial action.8 The Louisiana rule,
1. The general rule at common law has long been that there is no right
of action for contribution between joint tortfeasors. Gobble v. Bradford, 226
Ala. 517, 147 So. 619 (1933); Central Georgia Ry. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App.
346, 98 S.E. 256 (1919); Village of Portland v. Citizens' Telephone Co., 206
Mich. 632, 173 N.W. 382 (1919); Brown v. Southern Ry., 111 S.C. 140, 96
S. E. 701 (1918); City of Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505, 118 Pac. 642, 36
L.R.A. (N.S.) 582 (1911).
2. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 412.030; Md. Code Ann. (Flack, Supp. 1943)
art. 50, §§ 21-27; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939) § 3658; New York Civil Practice Act,
§ 211-a; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1935) § 618; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Ver-
non, 1935) art. 2212; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) § 5779; W. Va. Code Ann.
(Michie, 1943) § 5482.
3. Underwriters at Lloyd's of Minneapolis v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W.
13 (1926); Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918).
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